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Abstract
Economic analysis condemns market intervention in favour of farmers as inefficient, if not also
ineffective, and therefore well worth reform.  Practical experience, however, indicates that such lessons
are hard to learn and implement.  Part of the reason appears to be that economic analysis seldom clearly
identifies the real costs and benefits of reform, and seldom explains these sensibly to the relevant
constituencies.  Furthermore, economic analysis rarely explains why the protectionist measures were
adopted in the first place, or explores the dependencies that these policies generate.  Without these
explanations, and without reform strategies that take full account of them, policy reform will continue
to be reluctant, slow and frequently counterproductive.
This paper reconsiders the evolution of farm policies and the economic assessment of their costs and
benefits, and draws conclusions as to the general shape of reforms likely to reconcile economic
efficiency with political acceptability.  In so doing, it re-phrases conventional economic arguments in
terms which seem to accord better with sensible intuition, which may prove more accessible and
credible to policy makers and advisors. It concludes with a substantial challenge to the agricultural
economics profession.
Keywords:  policy dependency; policy reform; cost/benefit analysis; political negotiations;
liberalisationPolicy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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1. Introduction – the genesis of the policy dependency problem
Economic analysis seems to prove conclusively that farm support programmes that operate through
market intervention are inefficient – they cost more than they deliver. This conclusion is almost
universally derived against the benchmark of the competitive market. In essence, the competitive
market is governed by consumers, who earn their incomes and spending power through production.
Producers and production, in this story, are simply a means to an end – if they do not serve the
consumption demands (and thus also savings opportunities) efficiently, they can be expected to go to
the wall.  Economic analyses of policies that interfere with competitive markets, including agricultural
policies, simply demonstrate this point. The only remaining justification for policy then becomes one of
distributional equity (as recently outlined and reviewed by Bullock and Salhofer, 2003). And who
decides about distributional equity?  Government.
As the public choice discipline emphasises, competitive markets require government – to establish and
police property rights, enforce laws of contract, outlaw theft and regulate currencies, if nothing else.
The long arm of the law is necessarily attached to Adam Smith’s invisible hand.  But governments are
also used to repair inequities generated by the market system, to protect the many supply-side losers at
the expense of the fortunate and fewer winners.  So government becomes endogenous to the political-
economic systems we are dealing with. The more democratic the government system, the more likely
are losers demands to be met, simply because there are likely to be more losers than winners. But the
workings of the competitive market system will necessarily create both losers and winners – this is how
it works, and provides signals and penalties encouraging efficiency. With an endogenous government,
used by its constituents to remedy the raw outcomes of the market, intervention policies become
practically inevitable. The resulting mixed economic system contains within it the seeds of its own
destruction, curbed only by the limited willingness of the winners to pay.
This practical inevitability poses a major challenge to those who wish to see the end of market
intervention policies, which is most professional applied economists. So, if we are serious in our
ambitions, we need to examine the basis of this apparent inevitability in order to understand how it
might be made more evitable. If the political-economic system generates policy dependency, then we
need to understand how this occurs in order to suggest the means through which such dependencies can
be broken. The logic of policy dependency can be explained through the co-evolutionary histories and
patterns of farm policies with the political-economic systems in which they are embedded (e.g. Harvey,
1995).  These histories exhibit three critical dependencies.Policy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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2. Three Critical Policy Dependencies: an overview
2.1 Strategic Dependency
Without government, producers have to compete, in a life that is frequently nasty, brutish and short.
Marketing and management strategies to manage and, if possible, take control of the market are the
only apparent recipes for prosperity and replication.  But with government, an alternative route to
producer prosperity is opened up – persuasion of the government to act in producers’ rather than
consumers’ interests.  There are three major conditions that determine the extent to which governments
are likely to respond to this persuasion.
First, the more the sector is (like agriculture) subject to inevitable relative decline as economic progress
occurs, simply by Engel’s Law, the greater the pressure for support and protection.1 Second, the more
coherent are the production systems and sectors with electoral constituency sympathies, and the more
fundamental are the products of the system to survival and prosperity, the more likely it is that
government support for the sector will be forthcoming – that the winners will be willing to pay. Classic
examples of this condition in the developed world prevailed following WWII. Recent memories of
food insecurity (especially in Europe and Japan) bred domestic policies aimed at self-sufficiency.
Third, the more atomistic is the sector, and thus the more reliant individual firms are on the vagaries of
the market place (as opposed to their own marketing management capacities), the more benefits the
people in it are likely to gain from efforts at political persuasion rather than market manipulation. Since
production necessarily involves specialisation, producers (however atomistic) will be more
concentrated than consumers.  It follows that producers’ individual gains from market protection will
outweigh individual consumer and taxpayer losses, incurred as a result of the protection.  It will thus
pay producers to exert more effort in persuading the political system of their just deserts than
consumers and taxpayers can be expected to spend on opposing such protection.
On all three counts, substantial support and protection of the farm sector is practically inevitable as
development occurs.  Furthermore, both the nature and the extent of support are also predetermined.
Support will naturally be coupled, and will naturally gravitate towards market protection. Any other
                                                
1  de Gorter and Tsur (1991) explore the formal calculus of this condition (as populations shift from being predominantly
agrarian (rural) to predominantly industrial (urban), and propose that political support (for redistributive policies)
depends on both per capita relative incomes and the extent of redistributed incomes.  This calculus is consistent with
many of the observed features of support over both time and space.Policy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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support system will contradict the market mechanisms which both gave birth to the pressures for
support, and which precondition coherent, and thus sustainable responses to such pressures. The extent
of support is also predetermined.  Economies blessed with or cursed by major peasant sectors (the old
and more densely populated worlds) will tend to generate greater levels of support and protection than
those without such sectors (the new world). But the extent of support depends on the willingness of the
payers to bear the costs. The faster is economic development, the greater will be the disparities between
agriculture and the rest of the economy, and the more willing will the rest of the economy be to support
their poorer cousins. Furthermore, importing economies will generate higher levels of protection than
exporting economies, simply because protection of the latter is clearly counter-productive, and support
is necessarily at the expense of the taxpayer, whose interests are more strongly represented and
deployed than those of the consumer, at least within richer societies.  The patterns of farm support
around the world, both across space and over time, well demonstrate this outline logic.
This is the first major dependency – the strategic dependency - the egress of economies from an
agrarian to an industrial condition, especially when coupled with democratic government, will naturally
generate pressures for agricultural support and farm market intervention.  These pressures will be
stronger the more rapid the pace of development, the larger the farming-dependent population (and thus
the greater the structural shift required in the move from the agrarian to industrial condition), and the
more vulnerable the local population feels their food supplies to be. This dependency (though not
always so titled) has, of course, been well documented for a variety of different cases, for example, the
classic study of Japanese agricultural policy (Hayami, 1988).
Progress towards liberalisation of the farm sector thus depends on sufficient decline in the importance
and electoral dominance of the sector and its sympathisers (those who have recently exited the
industry) to offset its natural political advantage. It also depends on the evolving extent to which
farmers are perceived to be significantly worse off than their non-farming neighbours. That is,
liberalisation depends on sustained economic progress away from its agrarian roots, at both the macro
and the micro level.
2.2. Support Dependency
However, even then, the prospects for substantial reform are not strong. The offsetting pressures,
sustaining support, are generated by the degree of previous support and the extent to which this support
has been captured in the wealth of the supported sectors and its dependents, and thus becomePolicy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
6
embedded in the cost structure of the industry.  The greater are both these, the more difficult
liberalisation will prove. This is the second major dependency – the support dependency – the greater
the levels and history of support, the more dependent will the farm and farm supply chain become on
continuing levels of support, and the greater will be the resistance to its removal. It is this dependency
which underlies the “conservative welfare function” (Corden, 1974, also Winters, 1987b and
MacLaren, 1992), in which political systems will generally seek to prevent, and certainly seldom
initiate, changes which significantly reduce the current welfare of any substantial and identifiable group
in society. The more coherent and organised the group, and the more substantial the threatened welfare
reduction, the more resistant the political economy is likely to be to genuine policy reform. It is in this
context that the Olson (1965) model of lobbying power and interest group pressure is more plausible
than is the case under the strategic dependency leading to the existence of support in the first place.
This resistance is not always fatal for reform, as the New Zealand experience shows, though it is clear
(e.g. Scrimgeour and Pasour, 1996), that a combination of circumstances is needed for successful
reversal of this force for continued support. In particular, this experience suggests that farm policies are
easier to reform if they are young and thus incompletely embedded in the cost structure of the sector,
and also if done in conjunction with a more general economic reform. Even then, the institutional
framework and constitutional conditions are likely to be critical. At the very least, breaking this
dependency requires compensation, as completely distinct from continued support for equity or other
reasons.
We return to this dependency below, since it is the essential link between the conventional economic
analysis of policy effects and the nature of the policy system itself.
2.3. Programme Dependency
The birth and development of policy intervention necessarily involves the emergence of bureaucracies
and political establishments whose continued existence is dependent on the policy.  While some more
advanced economic analyses try to take account of the transactions costs involved in policy
implementation, these analyses typically only pay lip service to the substantial political and
bureaucratic vested interests in policy continuation. However, it is difficult to imagine these groups
willingly conniving at their own critical evaluation and elimination, or actively seeking radical policy
reform without very substantial pressure from other parts of the economic polity.  The typical response
to pressures for policy reform is for the existing policies to become infested with immunisingPolicy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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stratagems (à la Popper, 1959), by which reform pressures are absorbed through modification of
existing policies rather than their wholesale replacement (still less, elimination). Policies tend to
become more and more complex, and thus more difficult to change. The devil of the conception
becomes manifest in the detail.
Furthermore, a history of farm support breeds the common perception that governments and their
associated bureaucracies both can and should be responsible for curing all the ills of an otherwise
competitive market place. While specific governments can and obviously do fail and are replaced, the
system of government itself is not seen as a source of failure but rather as a means of rectifying failures
elsewhere.
The consequences are already becoming apparent, especially in the EU. Economic progress generates
increased demands for “rurality” as people demand more and better space and landscapes within which
to both work and play. The demands are especially strong in densely populated rich countries (western
Europe and Japan). Provision of such ruralities is frequently associated with visions of historic
production systems, practices and structures, delivering a new argument in favour of support and
protection of at least the more ‘backward’ or remote (and frequently less prosperous) sections of the
agrarian sector. Multi-functionality is bred and nurtured as a sustainable reason for farm support
systems, again more vigorously proposed and defended in the old world than the new, preconditioned
as it is by the preponderance of a native peasant class and associated structures, including the
programme dependencies. The logic of the interaction between the joint pursuits of social goods
(correcting for genuine market failures through resource transfers) and of rents (pursuit of self-interest
by the participants in the policy system) has been well explained by Rausser, 1982. However, the
general presumption that government is competent to deal with issues of multi-functionality or other
forms of traditional market failure is seldom questioned (though see, e.g., Harvey, 2003). The strategic
dependency thus co-evolves with the programme dependency to generate a new hegemony of interest
in preserving ruralities and a common belief in the competence of government to deliver these through
more or less conventional support systems.
It is in the nature of support systems, as with market systems, that the more adventurous will find more
effective ways of farming and cultivating them than the less adventurous. Preservation of historic
entitlements for these farmers is worth some effort and pressure. These pressures will fit well with the
political and bureaucratic networks and mechanisms, and will tend to be mutually re-inforcing. SectoralPolicy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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support will tend to remain and be encouraged, albeit more indirectly, despite all good intentions, and
will continue to reward the few at the expense of the many.  The circle of support does not naturally
become more virtuous.  The answer does not lie in designing ever more rigorous and targeted support
systems, even though such targeting and rational design is clearly necessary somehow to solve public
good and externality problems.  The answer lies in breaking the support and programme dependencies
generated and encouraged by the evolutionary history of the farm support policy systems.  For this, it is
necessary to reconsider the nature of these dependencies.
3. Some Basic Analysis: the nature of support dependency
Josling, 1969, was amongst the first to bring the importance of policy transfers (as opposed to
deadweight efficiency costs) to our attention.  The implications of the simple partial geometric analysis
of farm policy have now become so familiar that we tend to treat such analysis with contempt.
However, the analysis is worth re-visiting.
Consider, first, the simple economics of an import protection policy, Figure 1, drawn for a large
country, as illustrated by the European Union (in the “good old days”). Other things being equal,
importing political economies are likely to choose import protection in favour of the alternative of
deficiency payment or direct subsidy support (Figure 2), despite the higher economic costs of so doing.
Figure 1. The simple economics of an import levyPolicy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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The obvious reason is that the former generates tax revenues while the latter spends them.
Furthermore, ceteris paribus, those import-protecting countries are likely to demonstrate higher levels
of protection than their subsidising counterparts.  The major offsetting force to such natural tendencies
is the effect of the policy on the rest of the world.  The losses imposed on the rest of the world tend to
be greater, and certainly more transparent, under the import protection system than under the subsidy
alternative, especially given the relative levels of support provided under each alternative.  There can
be little doubt that the UK chose the subsidy alternative in preference to import protection (before
joining the EU) precisely because of the perceived importance of her commonwealth trading partners
(predominantly agricultural exporters) and her strong links with the USA.  Her European neighbours
were considerably less constrained by such commonwealth family ties or world market concerns.
Figure 2. The simple economics of a deficiency payment
As such support policies become entrenched, so the process of economic development also tends to
shift developed country supply curves substantially to the right, in excess of growth in domestic
demand, classically exemplified in the EU, so that traditional importers tend to become exporters
(Figure 3).
The consequences of the move to an export status are abundantly clear.  The losses suffered by the
culprit country now become self-evident, in either increasing tax costs or mounting surpluses, thus
provoking strong support limiting pressures at home, again well illustrated by the EU case.
Furthermore, the exasperation of trading partners grows, exerting growing external pressure on the
domestic policy.  The timing of the Uruguay Round (UR) was not accidental. Such a round had to
await the development of competing and subsidised exports from both sides of the Atlantic.  The gainsPolicy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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to be obtained from a collective, negotiated agreement were also clear – the losses sustained under an
export subsidy regime appear significantly greater than those of the equivalent import protection
regime, especially to competing exporters (the US and other new world countries). Under such
circumstances, some positive outcome to the UR was bound to happen.
Figure 3. The simple economics of an export subsidy
The surprise of the UR, and of domestic EU policy reform, according to this logic, was not that it
happened, but that it was so modest.  Had it not been for the happy collapse of the Berlin wall,
dramatically altering Germany’s national interests in the structure and extent of farm support (by
converting the country from a natural importer to an natural exporter), it might well be that the round
would still be underway, such is the apparent resistance to genuine policy reform.
A substantial part of the explanation of this resistance lies in the relative magnitudes of the gains and
losses associated with reform.  Obvious though the social costs of farm policy maybe in principle, as
illustrated in the figures above, quantitative estimates of the social costs turn out to be distressingly
small, in comparison with trade revenues, or with the major transfers involved (e.g. as classic
examples, Tyers and Anderson, 1992; Winters, 1987).  This fact is not surprising. Elasticities of both
supply and demand for farm products at the farm gate are typically low, making domestic welfare
losses (the triangles) very small. Trade volumes compared with total supplies and demands are
typically sufficiently small to make reasonable estimates of elasticities of excess demand and supply
curves high (see, e.g. Josling, 1977, Harvey, 1997b).Policy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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Of course, the social costs of policies illustrated in the above diagrams are only partial. Firstly, policy
itself is not a costless exercise, generating considerable transaction costs.  Not only do tax cost require
revenue-raising interventions, imposing additional costs on society (e.g. Alston and Hurd, 1990,
Ballard and Fullerton, 1992, Browning, 1987; see also, Fullerton, 1991), but the mechanics of
intervention themselves also require resources.  It is difficult to imagine that these costs amount to less
than 10% of policy transfers, and easy to suppose that these transaction costs are considerably greater
for more complex policy systems, as generated through more resilient and longer-standing policy
systems.
Partial estimates of social costs and benefits also ignore the second round effects elsewhere in the
economies affected.  General equilibrium models try to take account of these effects (e.g. Winters,
1987, for an early review). These models are difficult to simplify sufficiently for non-experts to
appreciate fully (and thus believe). However, the partial social costs of a policy can be considered as if
they were withdrawals from the circular flow of income, since they represent foregone consumption
possibilities. The general equilibrium effects can therefore be approximated by applying the Keynesian
multiplier (typically no larger than 2 in most modern economies, and often rather smaller) to the partial
estimates, which thus underestimate the general economic costs by a factor of around 2 or less.
It is only when intervention policies themselves insulate and protect domestic markets from world
market forces that the relevant excess supply and demand elasticities become low enough to generate
significant (but still typically small) world price effects.  In fact, it is this very point that makes the
extent of support policies self-limiting, as was well demonstrated in the UR.  The more protective
domestic policies become, the greater the spill-over effects on the world market, and the higher become
the consequent reflected costs to domestic interests (especially taxpayers), particularly for exporting
countries. Perhaps the modest UR agreement represents a political economy equilibrium, in which the
interactive effects of domestic protection and support are just sufficiently modified to justify continued
domestic support. Maybe export subsidies can be eliminated eventually, but they seem almost bound to
be replaced by near-equivalent domestic support systems (witness the recent developments of both EU
and US policies). To hope otherwise requires that the near universal support dependency culture be
broken or dissipated.Policy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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4. The support dependency culture
The producers’ surplus, identified by the conventional partial analysis of policy, is the analytical key to
support dependency. Producers’ surplus, if defined over a short run supply curve, is quasi-rent – returns
to production factors engaged in the farm product supply chain over and above those necessary to
retain these factors within the supply chain.  The normal workings of competitive markets bid these
quasi-rents into long run costs, capitalising the rents into the values of the chain-specific factors. The
extent to which particular factors attract the rent transfers of policy depends on their specificity to the
farm product supply chain.  The more inelastic is the supply of these factors to the chain, the greater the
extent to which their values will be increased by farm product support. By the same token, the balance
of producers’ surplus (not accounted for in long run rents of farm specific factors) is dissipated in
transfer earnings - merely offsetting incomes that would have been earned elsewhere in the economy in
the absence of the policy.
As a consequence of this inescapable logic (the physics of the economic system), new entrants to the
supply chain, obliged to pay their entrance fee that is equivalent to the policy induced rents, are no
better off with the policy than without it.  The only gainers are those who owned the chain specific
assets prior to the introduction of the policy, who benefit from a windfall policy gain in the value of
their assets (including any specific labour and management assets).  Otherwise, all the policy can
possibly succeed in doing is to raise the costs of the chain, by raising capital and factor costs.
This logic is captured, at least in part, by a general equilibrium formulation of the policy analysis. Here,
any social gains from policy reform only appear as gains in consumers’ surplus.  There is no general
equilibrium counterpart to the producers’ surplus of partial analysis. In effect, GE models include the
effects elsewhere of the release of excess transfer earnings from the supported sector, thus reducing the
downside effects of policy liberalisation, and increasing the estimate of net social benefits compared
with partial counterparts.  However, any sector specific factors in GE models (which do not transfer to
other sectors, such as land) will suffer a decline in rents and income, which translates into an offsetting
decline in consumption, limiting the net social gains indicated by the models.
Conventional reports of partial analyses of policy reform are obliged to account for the reductions in
producers’ surplus.  Typically, these estimates are interpreted, at least by policy makers and advisors,
as reductions in farmers or farm incomes, and thus (as the partial logic requires) as reductions in
producers’ welfare. Since these results conform exactly to sensible intuition of the effects of policyPolicy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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reform, it is hardly surprising that such estimates encourage policy inertia.  While GE model estimates
can be presented so as avoid this particular trap, they become less credible to policy makers simply
because they then appear to ignore the downsides of policy change – the reductions in farm incomes.
Once these reductions are elaborated, the trap opens again, and is made deeper for non-economist
policy makers by the apparent complexity of the GE model itself.
Such interpretations, however, ignore the first principle of applied welfare economics – the principle of
compensation.  Since these reductions in income (policy rents) are translated through the market
mechanisms into the capital values of the underlying assets, they can (and arguably should) be
compensated.  Once such compensation is complete, the arithmetic of policy reform looks completely
different. As a recent example, consider the results of a partial analysis of elimination of EU dairy
policy (Colman et al., 2002), as represented in Table 1.
As can be seen from the table, considerable effort was made in this study to augment the traditional
partial and comparative static estimates of the consequences of policy elimination. Both transactions
costs and the general equilibrium effects have been included, while (perhaps even more contestably)
estimates of the potential dynamic effects (stemming from release of the benefits of structural and
technical changes at the farm level, and liberalisation of dairy marketing chains) have also been
included. Nevertheless, the overall social gains still only amount to 23% of the losses estimated for
producers.  These figures can hardly be expected to convince congenitally sceptical policy-making and
policy interested audiences.  This is barely surprising, since they ignore the consequences of possible
compensation.
Table 1.  Costs & Benefits of Eliminating EU Dairy Policy (¤bn, real terms, 2010)




Net Partial Static Benefit 0.34
Transaction Cost (@ 10% of SB transfer payment)) 0.37
General Equilibrium effect (@ multiplier of 1.2) 0.14
General Static Net Benefit 0.85
Dynamic gains 1.42
Overall Net Benefit of Elimination 2.27
Source: Colman et al., 2002.Policy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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Consider the following suggestion for EU dairy policy reform, which echoes the principles of the
recent Australian reform of dairy policy. Abandon all present instruments of dairy policy in the EU,
including quotas, immediately, and compensate producers with a lump sum payment, representing the
loss in the value of the dedicated factors associated with dairy production.  In the case of dairy quotas,
most of this value is already associated with quota ownership. This compensation payment can be
funded through taxpayer spending on the current policy (¤3.7bn.) augmented by a temporary tax on all
dairy products consumed in the EU equivalent to the annual consumer cost of the present policy
(¤6.6bn.).
At a 5% real discount rate (reflecting the commercial risk associated with the anticipated continuation
of the present policy), the producers’ surplus estimate in Table 1 amounts to ¤76bn. over 10 years
(which is, incidentally, a considerable over-estimate of the current market value of dairy quota).
Provision of this lump sum would fully compensate producers for the reductions in values of their
policy-enhanced assets. It could be fully financed by an amortisation of the current consumer and tax
costs of the present policy (¤10.28bn.), at 3% (reflecting the lower social opportunity cost associated
with public funds) over 9 years. From year 10 onwards, EU society would be unambiguously better off
by ¤12.5bn per year – the heaven of an unambiguously welfare improving policy change, though even
this figure amounts to less than ¤100 per worker in the EU. This, at the end of the day, is the true cost
of the programme dependency generated by the history of dairy support in the EU.
The conventional partial welfare arithmetic, conducted on annual flows, completely ignores the
potential benefits to be realised from a longer-term re-allocation of society’s “fixed” resources – the
land and capital which attracts and accumulates the producers’ surplus or rents accruing from policy
intervention. Even general equilibrium representations of the economic system only partially capture
the benefits of this reallocation, since the re-investment possibilities are inevitably restricted to a given
set of input/output relationships, themselves preconditioned by the price relatives ruling under policy
intervention. The dynamics of factor markets are typically excluded from general equilibrium models.
5.  Liberalisation – breaking the addictions of farm policy
Compensation, according to this logic, is the critical feature of any sensible policy reform. The
fundamental economics dictate that there is a price for which the current apparent beneficiaries ofPolicy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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policy support can be persuaded to give up their rights to continued support.  Unless this price is paid,
policy will not change other than by dictatorship.  Even then, compensation for policy-induced
reductions in asset values is more than simply an equity question; it also has efficiency implications.
Given reasonably competitive quota transfer arrangements and associated capital markets, there is no
reason to suppose that the present population of farmers is not largely made up by those who consider
they have a comparative advantage in farming. Given an inelastic supply of these people, an
uncompensated change will result in a considerable transition period (and associated economic costs)
during which at least some (the more productive) of these displaced farmers seek the means and
opportunities through which to resume their preferred occupation. It is inefficient to make it more
difficult than necessary for them to do so.
A major conclusion from economic analysis is that any compensation for policy elimination must be
fully decoupled, otherwise it simply degenerates into conventional production related support.  Fully
decoupled, in the limit, means that the market outcome achieved with decoupled compensation should
be indistinguishable from that with an uncompensated change.  However, this strict condition is an
ideal that cannot be met in practice. Any form of compensation will affect the capacity of present
producers to adjust, and thus will affect the market outcome in some way.  The point of the previous
paragraph, however, is that an uncompensated reform will generate a market outcome (the free market
benchmark) which in this case is less efficient than a compensated outcome.
The most nearly fully decoupled form of compensation possible is a once-and-for-all lump sum
payment (e.g. Tangermann and Swinbank, 2000) that is, for all practical purposes, production neutral.
Once distributed, neither the decision to continue farming or not, nor the decisions about what, how
and where to farm, should be affected by the lump sum payment.  In effect, the lump sum payment
simply compensates the owners of dairy farm assets for the fall in their value occasioned by the policy
change. Otherwise, it has no effect on the disposition of these assets, which are freely tradeable and
thus convertible into what ever sector and practice the owner wishes.
This freely tradeable and convertible character of compensation is the only practical and sensible
definition of “fully decoupled”. Such a lump sum payment would clearly provide, in readily liquid
form, the capital reserves necessary for adjustment to the new unsupported and unprotected market.
Adjustment problems would be very substantially eased by such compensation, most likely to a greater
extent than any alternative form of compensation. The justification is twofold: first, compensationPolicy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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provides the necessary capacity for the current industry participants to adjust to a liberalised world;
second, it recompenses owners of dedicated assets for policy (socially) induced reductions in their
value – the value of these owners’ pension funds.  Without the second component, policy reform will
remain seriously difficult, if not impossible.
But such compensation does not deal with programme dependency. This dependency of bureaucrats
and politicians typically results in substantial efforts to re-cast compensation ideas into continued
payments, justified on new grounds (e.g. environmental or multifunctional) for continued support for
an identifiable constituency, as closely related to the farming sector as possible.  In turn, programme
dependency is re-inforced by any vestiges of traditional strategic dependency – the apparent socio-
political need to support sectors which are disadvantaged by economic progress and growth.
6.  Conclusions
Identification and acknowledgement of the dependency culture of farm support policies is likely to be a
necessary step in breaking the addiction, but it is unlikely to be sufficient. As is obvious from other
areas of social and individual behaviour, breaking dependencies requires a commitment on the part of
the addict to breaking the habit.  While the economic (support) dependency can be broken relatively
easily, as the Australian and New Zealand examples clearly show, removing the strategic and
programme dependencies is likely to be far more difficult (as the European and American examples
illustrate). Support groups for detoxification are typically regarded as valuable. The WTO provides
exactly such peer group pressure and encouragement for the breaking of habits.  But for these to work,
addicts must be willing to cooperate and commit to such groups. So long as the victims remain
convinced that they are better off with the habit than without it, such cooperation and commitment will
be lacking. Cultivation of cooperation and commitment requires that the nature of the dependency be
identified, recognised and respected, rather than vilified.  Too much economic analysis is presented
either as vilification of the habit of support, or as ignoring the nature and basis of, particularly, strategic
and programme dependency, if not of support dependency itself (as demonstrated by the tendency to
dismiss compensation as a “mere” equity or political expediency issue). But we can account for full
compensation and identify the true costs of programme dependency – the first and critical steps in
breaking the addiction to existing programmes. Compensation is thus critical for the breaking of both
the support and programme dependencies.Policy Dependency and Reform: Economic Gains versus Political Pains
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However, strategic dependency promises (or threatens) to be the critical barrier to further liberalisation
of farm policy, both domestically and thus also internationally, as well evidenced by developed
countries propositions of multifunctional justifications, as well as by the demands by developing and
transition countries for continued special treatments. It is fundamentally irrational to ignore the strong
strategic pressures for farm sector support, especially amongst developing and transition economies.
Much more intelligent thought and analysis is required to develop sensible support policies to cope
with this problem.  Simply asserting that such policies cannot work, and are economically inefficient,
and should therefore be illegal – the basic argument of the liberalising tendencies – is deeply
insufficient: political economies in the process of industrialising cannot be expected to accept such
arguments. While integrated rural development and adjustment assistance programmes might appear to
provide efficient palliatives for this strategic pressure, the evidence from developed country histories is
that they are insufficient.  Some more general and more visible support system for the declining sector
appears necessary to buffer the socio-political pressures of economic development. The profession of
agricultural economics needs to recognise this, and devote some effort to designing and promoting
sensible policies to cope.
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